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Abstract
This thesis argues that wage suppression along with the decline in the labor share
is caused by a rise in monopsony power realized as a significant increase in the profit share.
It attributes the rise in monopsonistic behavior to the development and expansion of the
modern corporation. This thesis investigates the reasons for wage suppression, identifies
causes of the declining labor share left as exogenous in mainstream models, examines
traditional economic wage determination and search models, and evaluates the political
economy implications. This work reviews literature on imperfect competition, the
corporation, contracts, search and match models, and the motivation of these models to
explain wage determination. This thesis finds that traditional economic models do not
accurately reflect the labor market because they neglect labor market power. The power
wielded by megacorporations is responsible for widely documented wage suppression in
the United States.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
An indicator that something is amiss in the labor market stems from a famous graph,
Figure 1, depicting the non-linear relationship between real wages and productivity over
time.

From about 1949 to the 1970s, productivity and real hourly compensation rose in tandem.
Figure 1: Real hourly compensation and Productivity Gap. Reprinted from Fleck, S., Glaser, J., and Sprague, S., (2011). “The
compensation-productivity gap: a visual essay,” Monthly Labor Review

Indicators that this relationship went awry are prevalent across popular media and
academia alike. As shown in Figure 1, following the early 1970s, the linear relationship
was disrupted, with productivity growth increasingly outpacing the rise in real hourly
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compensation. In a recent Bureau of Labor Statistics article called “Understanding the labor
productivity and compensation gap,” Brill, Holman, et al. (2017) define labor productivity
as real output per hour and measure the efficiency of the use of labor in production. Labor
compensation is a measure of the cost of labor for the employer, including a worker’s base
salary and benefits. Textbook theory suggests that as labor productivity increases, labor
compensation should increase accordingly, because wages are determined by net marginal
productivity.

Figure 2: Productivity Over Time with Adjustments for Change in Labor Share of Income and Difference in Deflators.
Reprinted from Brill, M., Holman, C., Morris, C., Raichoudhary, R., and Yosif, N. (2017). “Understanding the labor
productivity and compensation gap,” Beyond the Numbers: Productivity, vol. 6, no. 6. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

As is illustrated by the above graphs, this is not the case—that supposed relationship was
disrupted starting in the early 1970s. “The gap between productivity and compensation can
be divided into two components: (1) the difference between the compensation adjusted by
the CPI and by the output deflator…and (2) the change in the labor share of income”
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(Brill, M., Holman, C., Morris, C., Raichoudhary, R., and Yosif, N., 2017). The consumer
price index (CPI) measures the buying power of the worker, while the output deflator
measures the value of labor versus other factors of production over time. The labor share
of income measures how much value generated is going to workers as opposed to the other
components of production or profit. As revealed in Figure 2, whether compensation is
adjusted by the CPI, or the output deflator, can significantly impact the amplitude of the
gap between productivity and compensation. However, regardless of the compensation
adjustment method, wages do not rise in a linearly with productivity. Brill et al. (2017)
argue that the position of the labor productivity compensation gap varies by sector and
industry, but “the labor share of income declined in 77% of industries studied,” meaning
that a growing share of income was diverted from employee compensation over the period
studied. This will be elaborated on in Chapter 4 of this thesis, where it will be shown that
since the 1970s, the labor share has declined while the profit share has risen.

Figure 3: Change in Labor Share of Income and Difference in Deflators for Different Sectors. Reprinted from Brill, M.,
Holman, C., Morris, C., Raichoudhary, R., and Yosif, N. (2017). “Understanding the labor productivity and
compensation gap,” Beyond the Numbers: Productivity, vol. 6, no. 6. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Figure 3 shows the labor productivity-compensation gap grew faster between 1987 and
2000 than it did between 2000 and 2015. Industries do not experience changes in
compensation uniformly because they do not have uniform composition or uniform
methods of output measurement. Some industries have greater degrees of consolidation,
imperfect competition, opportunity for outsourcing, or other innovations on the part of
employers. Other industries may need to incentivize workers to participate, often offering
workers increased “rents” or benefits in order to do so. This thesis will expand on these
differences and elaborate the ways in which they impact wage determination.
A criticism for using productivity as a key parameter in wage determination is that
for many industries, productivity is intangible or very difficult to measure. This
intangibility increases the potential for firms to capture rents from the gain generated from
their workers or vice versa. In the working paper, “The Political Economy of U.S. Output
and Employment 2001-2010,” Foley (2011) argues that the inclusion of service industries
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) distorts macroeconomic measures. Foley provides
empirical evidence that output from many sectors, particularly in Finance, Insurance, and
Real Estate, Education and Health services, and Professional and Business services have
output measurement, and therefore productivity measurement, challenges (Foley, 2011).
Due to these measurement challenges, the output of these industries, particularly the FIRE
(Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) sector, is imputed by making the value added equal to
the wages and profits generated (Foley, 2011).1 The imputed value is reflected in
measurements such as GDP and other national account measures. The impact of these

1

By contrast, manufacturing output is measured by the sales revenue less the costs of inputs, with
investment and labor cost excluded (Foley, 2011).
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imputed values on analyses is unquestionable. Foley (2011) conducted an analysis to
determine the magnitude of the economic downturn caused by the Great Recession of
2007-8. Using Okun’s Law that a 1% change in aggregate demand leads to a 2% change in
employment, he tried to estimate the change in aggregate demand as well as employment
(Foley, 2011). When leveraging GDP as a measure, his aggregate demand projection was
quite inaccurate, while his unemployment predictions were accurate. This implied that the
U.S. could be producing real output without correspondingly adding workers (Foley,
2011). The divergence between output and employment emphasizes gains generated
without corresponding productivity or labor increases which leads to distributional
disparities of these gains. This finding noted the divergence between GDP and employment
during and following the Great Recession. To explore this problem, Foley leveraged an
index he called the Narrow-Measured Value Added (NMVA), which eliminated the service
sectors from GDP. Foley found that the historic NMVA correlation to employment was
much closer than the measure of national income (NI) since 2001. Figure 4 depicts “the
1947-2000 fitted relation between NI (blue) and NMVA (red) together with quarterly
points from 2001Q1 to 2010Q4” (Foley, 2011).

5

Figure 4: National Income and Narrow Measured Value-Added Employment Predictions. Reprinted from Foley,
Duncan K. (2011) “The Political Economy of U.S. Output and Employment 2001-2010.” Schwartz Center for
Economic Policy Analysis and Department of Economics, The New School for Social Research, Working Paper Series

When Foley (2011) eliminated the service sectors with imputed output values from his
analysis via the NMVA index, he was able to accurately predict aggregate demand. These
empirical findings highlight the measurement challenges and corresponding pitfalls
associated with service sectors of the economy. These challenges show that productivity
and output measurement challenges are palpable and motivate the need to examine other
ways of looking at the labor compensation, to pull distributional ambiguities and their
corresponding wage depression out of the shadows.
In addition to measurement challenges associated with some industries, it is
important to question the existence of productivity itself for the same industries. This can
be explored by contrasting the classical theory of value with the neoclassical theory of
value. Duncan Foley points out that classical political economists like Smith, Ricardo, and
Marx differentiated productive from unproductive labor, where productive labor produced
a market good or service, and unproductive labor did not produce anything tangible (Foley,
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2011, p.8).2 This is not to say these “unproductive” workers are not legitimate workers; the
argument is that this classification of workers is not engaging in social production. “Like
the declamation of the actor, the harangue of the orator, or the tune of the musician, the
work of all of them perishes in the very instant it of its production” (Smith, 1979, Book II,
p.331). Early neoclassical economists, on the other hand, believed that goods and services
are worth what someone will pay, regardless of the tangibility of what is produced (Foley,
2011). From this perspective, it is incoherent to distinguish from productive and
unproductive labor as the value of their product is measured by their incomes (Foley,
2011). Despite the equal perception of all types of labor offered by the early neoclassicals,
the measurement challenges associated with service sectors persist. These measurement
challenges provide added opportunity for firms to get more than their fair share by allowing
them to collect rents. Power is the mechanism that determines the distribution of gains from
productive activity, socially “beneficial” or not.
As an example, an accountant is not producing anything, but is rather providing the
service of keeping and interpreting financial records. There are challenges in measuring
the output of an accountant because they are not producing anything tangible that can be
sold. How can one accurately measure the value per hour of activities like spreadsheet
management and asset counting? Today, the value added by the accountant’s work is
imputed by revenues and profits. Additionally, when hiring an accountant and negotiating
a wage, does the employer understand the potential productivity of the accountant and
factor this productivity into their wage? There is evidence that employers are not sure of

2

“Marx noticed that the capitalist system also gave rise to a further class of unproductive workers
employed not to produce commodities, but to facilitate the realization of their value through sale on the
market, in retail and wholesale trade, or the financing of production” (Foley, 2011).
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the appropriate wage for workers, implying they do not know the productivity of their
workers. On top of these measurement and lack-of-perfect knowledge problems, the
distribution of gains generated by employers for the firm is often not fair or even efficient.
Often times, particularly for low wage workers, employers retain these gains and do not
distribute them to employees. This is reflected in the divergence between the wage and
productivity. In other circumstances, employees are able to generate rents over and above
what would be considered optimal for the exchange. The former case is more prevalent and
there is substantial empirical evidence to support it.

Wage Bunching
When considering wage determination mechanisms, there is substantial empirical
evidence that wages are determined not by productivity or output, but by employer
optimization challenges and the power a given employer has over its set of workers. In the
paper, “Monopsony and Employer Mis-optimization Explain Why Wages Bunch at Round
Numbers,” Dube, Manning, and Naidu (2018) provide empirical evidence of wages
bunching around $10.00 more often than would be predicted by a smooth marginal
productivity curve. The model and empirical evidence presented by Dube, Manning and
Naidu (2018) accurately reflect the labor market and is useful in thinking about how wages
are determined. They argue that wages in markets exhibiting significant bunching cannot
be explained by response rounding in survey data because it is statistically improbable for
optimal wage levels to be exactly round numbers (Dube et al., 2018). These findings
support the notion that gains are not fairly distributed because firms are not sure of the
most optimal wage to pay, and there are not mechanisms in place to enforce fair
distribution. Dube, Manning and Naidu (2018) question whether this rounding is driven by
8

worker left-digit bias or employer optimization frictions. They argue that behavior biases
of firms result in wage-setting bunching at round numbers and conclude that a moderate
amount of monopsony power is adequate to explain bunching documented in their research
(Dube et al., 2018). This argument reiterates employers are not paying wages based on the
marginal productivity of the worker and that an imbalance of power is lurking in the wage
determination equation. The following series of graphs hit home the pervasiveness of round
wages throughout the United States. Using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data for
2016, Dube et al. (2018) found a wage of $10.00 is approximately fifty times more likely
to be observed than either $9.90 or $10.10.

Figure 5: Wages bunched at round numbers. Reprinted from Dube, A., Manning, A., & Naidu, S. (2018). Monopsony and
Employer Mis-optimization Explain Why Wages Bunch at Round Numbers. National Bureau of Economic Research,
24991st ser. doi:10.3386/w24991

Figure 5 shows the hourly distribution from the CPS outgoing rotation group (ORG) data
between 2010 and 2016. The highest modal spike on the graph is for wages of $10.00 per
hour, with other notable modal spikes occurring at other rounded wage values. Dube et al.
(2018) corroborate these findings using administrative Unemployment Insurance payroll
records from the states of Minnesota and Washington, shown in Figure 6. In the
9

Unemployment Insurance payroll data for Minnesota and Washington, $10.00 is the
greatest modal wage.

Figure 6: Wage bunching constructed with Unemployment Insurance payroll records. Dube, A., Manning, A., & Naidu,
S. (2018). Monopsony and Employer Mis-optimization Explain Why Wages Bunch at Round Numbers. National Bureau
of Economic Research, 24991st ser. doi:10.3386/w24991

Figure 7: Number of States with $10 Modal Wage over time. Reprinted from: Dube, A., Manning, A., & Naidu, S. (2018).
Monopsony and Employer Mis-optimization Explain Why Wages Bunch at Round Numbers. National Bureau of
Economic Research, 24991st ser. doi:10.3386/w24991

Figure 7 shows that since 2002, the modal wage has been $10.00 in 30 or more states,
reaching a peak of 48 states in 2008 (Dube et al., 2018). Dube et al. looked at wage markets
in several states and online to ensure reported round wage values were not a result of
erroneous survey reporting.
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To investigate their hypothesis, Dube et al. (2018) provide:
…an imperfectly competitive model with both workers’ left-digital bias, and
imperfect firm optimization in the form of employer preferences for round wages.
Left-digit bias is a widely documented phenomena of economic actors ignoring
lower-order digits in prices.
Dube et al. (2018) find that bunching at round-numbered wages is a function of worker
left-digit bias, the percent of profits employers are willing to give up in order to pay a round
number wage, and the elasticity of labor supply facing the firm, but that monopsony power
plays a larger role in the bunching than left digit bias (Dube et al., 2018). They give the
example that if employers had left-digit bias, any heaping would likely occur at $9.99
rather than $10.00 because the left-digit 9 is smaller than 10 (Dube et al., 2018). Likewise,
if workers rounded wages to the nearest dollar, employers would not be encouraged to pay
exactly $10.00. Further, Dube et al. (2018) find that employer optimization frictions imply
that jobs with appropriate wages above and below the round number will offer the round
number. Intuitively, this is not surprising as the presence of modest monopsonistic power
in the labor market leaves workers with little ability to negotiate a wage. Further, under the
search model framework discussed later in this thesis, workers are generally subject to
take-it or leave-it job offers where they are also not in a position to negotiate. The empirical
evidence presented by Dube et. al (2018) highlights bunching in low wage jobs. For the
purposes of this thesis, low-wage jobs are defined as those being below the living wage.
The living wage calculator of MIT defines the living wage as “an approximate income
needed to meet a family’s basic needs” (Nadeau, 2020). According to the MIT living wage
calculator, in 2016, the average living wage for a family of four, consisting of two working
adults and two children, was $15.84 per hour (Glasmeier, A., & Nadeau, A., 2017).
11

Dube et al. (2018) examine their results without worker left-digit bias, and conclude
that any given quantity of bunching can be explained by a combination of the degree to
which profits fall as wage deviate from the firm’s optimum.3 They assume that if employers
do not give up more than 1% in profits by selecting a round number wage, the implied
competition is very low, with firm-specific labor supply elasticities around 1; “even
allowing a 10% loss in profits, the implied labor supply elasticities are approximately 5.”
(Dube et al., 2018).
To further validate these results, Dube et al. (2018) designed and implemented an
online labor experiment, using the online Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowd
sourcing marketplace. Amazon describes MTurk as:
A marketplace for completion of virtual tasks that requires human intelligence. The
Mechanical Turk service gives businesses access to a diverse, on-demand, scalable
workforce and gives workers a selection of thousands of tasks to complete
whenever it’s convenient. ("Amazon Mechanical Turk FAQs," 2020).
Dube et al. (2018) randomly varied rewards above and below 10 cents for identical
tasks to estimate the labor supply function facing an online employer. “Like offline labor
markets, the task reward distribution on MTurk exhibits considerable bunching. However,
our experimentally estimated labor supply function shows no evidence of a discontinuity
as would be predicted by worker left-digit bias” (Dube et al., 2018). In addition to executing
the experiment, Dube et al. (2018) downloaded over 350,000 Human Intelligence Task
(HIT) batches, or tasks completed by workers in exchange for some sum and evaluated the
payments for bunching.

3

“Employer optimization frictions may reflect administrative costs, inattention, limits on manager
cognition, or norms that constrain wage setting behavior” (Chetty, 2012 referenced in Dube et al., 2018).
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Figure 8: Wage bunching in Online Labor Markets. Reprinted from Dube, Arindrajit, Jeff Jacobs, Suresh Naidu, and
Siddharth Suri. 2020. "Monopsony in Online Labor Markets." American Economic Review: Insights, 2 (1): 33-46.

Their findings, shown in Figure 8, reveal extensive bunching at round numbers in the
MTurk reward distribution. In Figure 8, the modal wage is 30 cents, with the next modes
at 5 cents, 50 cents, 10 cents, 40 cents, and $1.00. Dube et al. (2018) show that many more
workers in the United States are paid exactly round numbers than would be predicted by a
smooth distribution of marginal productivity, even if the jobs are online and task based.
They argue that this evidence indicates that the extent of round-number bunching can be
accounted for by monopsonistic power and a small degree of employer mis-optimization.
Wages are influenced by the wage mark-down driven by the presence of monopsonistic
power.

The Megacorporation and Frozen Labor Policies
In direct connection to the falling labor share of income and wage determination,
one may ask what happened beginning in the 1970s that drove firms, on the aggregate, to
not compensate workers accordingly as their profit share increased. This thesis will show
that the biggest appearances of monopsonistic power, also referred to as monopsonistic
13

behavior, are through innovations of the megacorporation and the lack of labor policies to
curtail these behaviors. The megacorporation became the dominant structure of the
American economy and has sufficient power to control many public policy outcomes
through the use of extensive lobbying. The megacorporation is able to achieve wage
suppression outcomes through many innovations including fissuring or subcontracting,
widespread use of non-compete agreements, and other predatory structures. Since the
1970s, few labor protection policies have been implemented, while simultaneously,
policies promoting deregulation of corporations were passed. A way to look at labor policy
inaction over the past fifty years and subsequent wage suppression it caused, can be through
the historic level of the real minimum wage. Figure 9 shows the quarterly value of the
minimum wage from 1940 to 2016 in constant 2016 dollars. The decrease in the value of
the minimum wage from its peak in 1970 highlights the policy importance of raising the
minimum wage and the lack of policy action taken. For additional context, the falling value
of the real minimum wage is problematic because it results in minimum wage workers not
being able to afford housing or healthcare among other necessities. A full-time minimumwage worker can only afford a one-bedroom apartment in 7 percent of all U.S. counties
(National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2021).

Additionally, 25% of Americans

reported skipping medical treatments due to cost in 2016 (The Federal Reserve, 2017).
Firms are not determining the optimal wage themselves, but rather maximizing profit by
purchasing labor at the price-floor level set by the government, at the expense of their
workers.

14

Figure 9: Decrease in the value of the minimum wage over time. Reprinted from DeSilver, D. (2020, May 30). 5 facts
about the minimum wage. Retrieved October 3, 2021, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/04/5-factsabout-the-minimum-wage/.

Monopsony Power in Recent Press
While economists have increased their discussion of monopsonistic power and
wage suppression in recent years, recent press has also identified that suppressed,
stagnating wages and rising power of megacorporations is problematic. Headlines from the
New York Times over the past five included “‘Super Star’ Firms May Have Shrunk
Workers’ Share of Income,” “Meager Rewards for Workers, Exceptional Pay for C.E.O.s,”
and “How Waning Competition Deepens Labor’s Plight.”
For much of the last century it seemed that the slice of the total economic pie going
to workers was — like the speed of light — constant…Workers’ unchanging share,
the economist John Maynard Keynes declared in 1939, was “one of the most
surprising, yet best-established, facts in the whole range of economic statistics.”
But in recent decades, that steady share — which includes everything from the chief
executive’s bonuses and stock options to the parking-lot attendant’s minimum wage
and tips — started to flutter. In the 2000s, it slipped significantly. (Cohen, 2017).
Journalist Patricia Cohen (2017) goes on to discuss the debate surrounding the causes of
the declining labor share that range from technological advancement, increases in
undocumented workers, to weakening unions. She lands on the role of monopsonistic
15

behavior, put forth by a 2017 working paper by Autor et al. called “Concentrating on the
Fall of the Labor Share” which provides evidence that industries with increases in firm
concentration have greater decline in labor share along with an increase in concentration
of sales to these few firms. An increase in revenues to these few firms creates a feedback
loop where those few firms have even more power, fueling labor share decline in those
industries. Monopsonistic power, imperfect competition, and their collective impact on
wages will be discussed extensively throughout this thesis.
Using the labor productivity compensation gap as motivation, this thesis will argue
that the trouble brewing in the labor market is more than the divergence of productivity
and compensation. While the decline in the labor share and associated wage suppression is
caused by a significant increase in the profit share, it is made possible by the rise,
empowerment and innovations of the megacorporation. Textbook neoclassical economics
characterizes wage determination as an optimal decision made by an employer and a
worker in response to the supply of labor and the expected value added from the interaction.
Power on the part of the worker or the firm is not considered as part of the model. This
thesis takes issue with this model because labor power is exogenous and asks what are the
other ways of looking at the labor market and what are their political economy
implications? This thesis investigates the reasons for income diversion from employee
compensation through a wage determination lens, identifies causes of the declining labor
share left as exogenous in mainstream models, examines traditional textbook economic
models for wage determination, and evaluates the political economy implications. This
thesis focuses exclusively on the economic outcomes of the United States. Aggregate
productivity and labor share will be examined at the macroeconomic level, with wage16

compensation models addressed at the microeconomic level, and finally the political
economy implications of these models will be discussed at the macroeconomic level. This
thesis provides various examples of monopsonistic power in the American economy and
its implications, including studies done by Arin Dube, Suresh Naidu, and David Weil.
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Chapter 2: Labor Market Power and Wage-Determination
This section defines monopsony power and articulates a framework to understand
wage determination in circumstances of balanced labor market power as well as
monopsonistic competition. The central question of this thesis is tied to imperfect
competition, the powerholding group in the labor market, and how this power leads to wage
suppression. The degree of labor market power present in a given firm, market, or industry
determines the role played by firms in wage determination. This section will explain Joan
Robinson’s view of monopsony and will discuss the influence of monopsonistic power on
wage determination and distribution. It will show the connection between monopsonistic
behavior and monopolistic behavior, which often go together as imperfectly competitive
markets tend to be so both on the buy and sell sides.
Labor market power can range from high for workers, in the case of a perfectly
competitive market, to non-existent for workers in the case of pure monopsony. The party
with the highest concentration of power within a given labor market has the biggest
influence on wage determination. Monopsony refers to a market where there are many
sellers and a single buyer. It is the inverse of the concept of monopoly, where there are
many buyers and a single seller. In a monopsonistic labor market, there is a single employer
or group of employers working in concert, and many workers selling their labor power in
exchange for a wage. The more general case where employers are treated as substitutes is
monopsonistic competition. The presence of monopsonistic behavior in a labor market
causes an imbalance of power between employers and workers (Manning, 2021).
18

In reality, labor markets have varying degrees of monopsonistic behavior, depending on
the degree of labor power in an industry. The higher degree of monopsonistic behavior
present, the higher the power firms have. This is because employers can set the wage with
a markdown, can limit the quantity of labor hired, and can threaten to and ultimately
terminate workers. This results in restricted wage levels, restricted hiring, and restricted
output, all of which make society worse-off.
Additionally, power enables employers to limit inter-firm mobility of workers
through mechanisms like non-compete agreements. These are binding documents that limit
mobility and therefore worker power, locking employees into contracts with single firms
even if other firms are present in the industry or geographic region. Non-competes and
similar agreements for low skilled workers are being investigated by least ten states and
the District of Columbia, with the goal of the investigation to quantify how many workers
are affected and the degree to which these agreements limit inter-firm job mobility
(Noguchi, 2018). Firms in many industries have acute power over their employee base and
use this power to grow their profits by minimizing worker pay and mobility through blatant
power overreaches like non-compete agreements and through more subtle ones like poor
working conditions, scant benefits, or other fissuring mechanisms like subcontracting,
outsourcing, and franchising. Chapter 3 of this thesis elaborates on these employer
innovations by drawing David Weil’s (2017) book The Fissured Workplace that identifies
firm outsourcing as a major innovation in employer power that leads to lower wages and
poorer working conditions. If there are worker protections in place such as unionization or
credentialing via a professional organization, workers may have higher power.
Unfortunately, in most organizations these additional worker protections are uncommon,
19

with private sector union membership rates falling steadily since the 1950s (Wolfe, J., &
Schmitt, J., 2018).

Monopsony: The Concept
Although it gained a notable increase of popularity in the twenty-first century, the
concept of monopsony is not new. One of the first examples of monopsony theory is laid
out in Joan Robinson’s The Economics of Imperfect Competition. Contrasting imperfect
competition from the theory of perfect competition, she evaluates firm buying behavior of
productive instruments and services to analyze the value of factors of production, including
labor. This analysis highlights a conflict of interest between firms and workers because
firms are profit maximizing organizations while workers are utility maximizing
individuals. Firm productivity comes at the expense of worker energy, decreasing utility
for workers. Robinson’s analysis of labor shows that the degree of imperfect competition
present in a given industry or firm influences the value of wages.
In her analysis, Robinson (1969) outlines theoretical assumptions, including the
assumption that individuals make rational decisions and act in their own self-interest. The
history of self-interested actions can be traced to Adam Smith’s theory of the invisible
hand:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves,
not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities
but of their advantages. (Smith, 1776, Book IV, Chapter II, p.465).
Smith claimed that if everyone acts in their own self-interest, society will be made better
off by the invisible hand. In simple economic models, producers act in their own selfinterest and want to maximize their profit. They are subject to conditions of demand as
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well as the costs of production. Robinson (1969) describes the decisions of the buyer as the
amount of advantage one gains from buying against the price of various amounts of the
product, based on the amount of utility the individual can gain. Gains are balanced against
costs. In these simple models, the demand of factors of production are perfectly elastic—
the invisible hand ensures that all individuals and firms are maximizing their utility and
profit, respectively. However, these simple models rely on perfect competition, which is
an edge case in reality. Today, there are few instances of perfectly competitive markets.
Yet, even in these few cases, firms are impacted by megacorporations, as these ultrapowerful firms dominate market share in most industries, and therefore influence and
impact smaller firms, even if these smaller firms are suppliers to megacorporations.
Joan Robinson introduced monopsony as a way to model the asymmetry in power
between the employer and the worker (Manning, 2021). The central theoretical backing of
monopsony is that the labor supply curve of a given firm is not perfectly elastic (Manning,
2021). The elasticity of a supply curve measures the proportional change of a quantity
supplied in response to a small change in price (Robinson, 1969). In the case of labor
supply, if there is a reduction in the wage paid (the price of labor), a perfectly elastic labor
supply curve predicts a decrease in the labor supplied. In fact, it is assumed that if a firm
decreases wages, all workers at the firm will simply find employment elsewhere. On the
other hand, if a supply curve is perfectly inelastic, small changes in price will not change
the quantity supplied. If there are few jobs in an industry and labor power is low, a decrease
in wages will not decrease the number of workers working at a given firm.
Depending on the degree of monopsony, if an employer cuts wages by 1 cent, the
employer may find it harder to recruit and retain workers but will not immediately lose all
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existing workers to competitors as is predicted by the perfectly competitive model
(Manning, 2021). Via Lerner’s formula, (price – marginal cost) / price, the elasticity of
supply determines the wage mark-down. The greater the inelasticity, the larger the markdown. The key idea is that elasticity is determined by how readily workers can find another
job. If the supply curve has a finite elasticity, a reduction in the wage leads to some
employees not taking jobs with the firm. However, some will still take the job and it
becomes an optimization problem for the firm to trade between lowering the wage and
losing employees. The firm will do this until the marginal benefit of the wage reduction
equals the marginal penalty on productivity of losing a worker. Employment opportunities
offered by different firms are substitutes with a finite elasticity of substitution. The idea of
the supply curve “facing the firm” allows for this framework to be used in many situations
in addition to when there is a single hiring firm. It applies to a myriad of situations where
the worker faces costs when exchanging labor for a wage. These costs could include
moving costs, retraining or education costs, or any other reason one firm is not a perfect
substitute for another. These costs open the door for employers to reap additional rents
from wage contracts, often exploiting employees. Society is worse-off because as firms
collect additional rents, output and hiring are restricted and wages are suppressed.
Robinson compares the amounts of a commodity purchased under perfect
competition and monopsonistic competition when the marginal utility curve and the supply
curve are fixed (1969, p.219). In monopsony, purchases are regulated so that marginal cost
is equal to marginal utility. Under perfect competition, average cost is equal to marginal
cost. If the supply price is diminishing, the marginal cost to the monopsonist will not be
equal to the price of the commodity. When a monopsonist hires workers, wages offered
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will be lower than in a perfectly competitive market. This is allowed to happen because of
the power differential between firms and workers in monopsonistic conditions. Wages are
suppressed due to the wage markdown associated with monopsonistic behavior.
It should come as no surprise that monopsony and monopoly are interconnected
and present themselves hand-in-hand, particularly in the abstract. This is best illustrated
with a representative agent model, known as the “Robinson Crusoe” economy, where there
is one agent and one firm. The agent owns the firm, provides the labor, and consumes what
the firm produces. Robinson Crusoe acts as a profit maximizing producer as well as a utility
maximizing consumer (Varian, 1992, p.349). At equilibrium, the demand for his good will
equal the supply, and the quantity of labor demanded will be equal to how much he
supplies. Implicitly, the monopolist in the output market is also a monopsonist in the labor
market.
Today, there are a few powerful firms that limit what society can consume and at
what price, and those same firms determine and limit wages. This means that firms
exhibiting monopsonistic behavior are likely also acting with monopolistic behavior. Firms
can reduce, or fail to raise, wages without correspondingly decreasing output. Robinson
(1969) explains that the principle of monopoly indicates that the monopolist will equate
marginal revenue (MR) to marginal cost (MC), which is also what firms in competitive
markets do. Importantly, monopolists earn a rent above their marginal cost, where
competitive producers do not. Robinson makes the argument that perfect competition is
only an edge case to the general rule of individual firms equating marginal cost to marginal
gain. This is opposite the neoclassical model that treats imperfect competition as the
exception rather than the norm. “Under competition, the unit of control is the firm, and it
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is marginal gain and marginal cost to the firm which govern output. When a monopoly is
formed it is marginal gain and marginal cost to the whole group which determines output”
(Robinson, p.231, 1969). This is an important nuance, because it dictates how policies to
increase fairness in the labor market are designed and implemented. If the assumption is
that perfect competition is the natural baseline, it is easy to understand the motivation of a
laissez-fair approach. When it is understood that this is rather an edge case, the need to
limit monopsonistic behavior and firm power in the labor market is apparent and obvious.

Labor as a factor of production
Robinson argues that in a neoclassical model, the demand price for labor will
correspond to the wage at which a quantity of workers will be employed, where wages are
equal to the marginal net productivity of labor. Joan Robinson argues that marginal net
productivity is reliant on abstract parameters like utility and productivity. This reliance on
immeasurable parameters combined with immense measurement challenges in many cases
provides an opportunity for firms to collect rents and to use their monopsonistic power to
suppress wages. Evidence for this is included earlier in this thesis with the work of Dube
and Naidu (2018) on wage bunching. Dube, Manning and Naidu (2018) find that bunching
is explainable both by mis-optimization as well as the presence of monopsonistic behavior.
Joan Robinson argues that the term “marginal” requires a point of view. “There is
no such thing as the marginal utility of bananas” (Robinson, 1969, p.236). This is because
there is only the marginal utility perceived by a given buyer. Robinson notes:
In the same way there is no such thing as the marginal productivity of a given group
of workers as such. There is only their marginal productivity to a given employer,
or group of employers. (Robinson, 1969, p.236).
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Like the marginal utility of bananas, marginal productivity of workers is perceived by the
employer rather than being an intrinsic quality emanating from workers themselves.
Marginal productivity is the increment of value of the total output caused by employing an
additional man, the total value of other factors remaining unchanged” (Robinson, 1969,
p.237). In perfect competition, marginal revenue is equal to price, thus marginal
productivity is equal to the marginal physical product. However, when imperfect
competition is present, “marginal revenue is less than price, and marginal productivity is
less than the value of the marginal physical product” (Robinson, 1969, p.237). This means
that rents are collected, and output and hiring are restricted. This makes society worse-off,
as there is social cost to these restrictions. Joan Robinson (1969) argues that marginal
productivity is only equal to wages in circumstances where the labor market is perfectly
competitive. The degree of power and immeasurability of marginal productivity itself
determines the size of the wage markdown.
Robinson’s analysis treats the cost of labor as unknown and relegates the cost of
the remaining factors of production to the capital term, whose conditions are known. Firms
will not pay more for a given factor of production than the marginal productivity gained
from the employment of that factor. Robinson (1969) argues that monopolists manage their
ratios of various factors of production differently than in perfect competition, using cheaper
factors of production and in different, restricted, proportions. Because imperfectly
competitive firms have the power to change the ratios of factors of production, the price of
labor is likely to be depressed below the level of marginal cost equal to marginal product
paid in perfectly competitive markets. This means that monopsonistic and monopolistic
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firms restrict output, and therefore restrict hiring, which makes both consumers and
workers worse-off.
Robinson (1969) defines exploitation as the payment to labor that’s less than its
proper wage and asserts that this occurs when there is a power imbalance between
employers and employees. Specifically, exploitation occurs if a factor of production is
employed at a price which is less than its marginal net productivity, meaning that the wage
is marked down. “Bargaining strength, as we shall find, is important in many cases, but the
fundamental cause of exploitation will be found to be the lack of perfect elasticity in the
supply of labor or in the demand for commodities” (Robinson, 1969). While this definition
of exploitation of labor is shockingly narrow, it adds value to the analysis of wage
determination because it highlights that wages do not trend with productivity in imperfectly
competitive markets. In the capitalist system, this happens because firms earn rents from
the relationship with workers and minimize the share given to workers themselves.
Furthermore, monopsonistic behavior is realized as a power imbalance between
firms and workers, where firms have the upper hand. Many models use perfect competition
as a starting point; Joan Robinson (1969) highlights that it is more appropriate to begin
analysis at imperfect competition, meaning policies need to be implemented to rebalance
power rather than eliminate intervention to prop up the edge case of perfect competition.
Further, this section makes the connection between monopsonistic behavior and
monopolistic behavior, which often go hand-in-hand as an imperfectly competitive market
tends to be so both on the buy and sell sides. The result is both a markdown on labor power
purchased, and a markup on output sold.
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Chapter 3: The Corporation
This section is focused on the structure that enables the flourishing of
monopsonistic power in the United States. It discusses the history of the corporation and
the how it evolved to control many industries. This analysis defines a traditional firm that
is small in size and function as “atomistic.” The other type of firm included in this analysis
is the “megacorporation” or “megacorp,” which is defined as a conglomeration of multiple
firms that could function independently. It is important to consider the historical context of
the development and spread of the megacorporation because it is a dominating structure
that enables the vast increase in the profit share at the expense of the labor share. When the
dominating structure of the megacorporation innovated through structural innovation,
fissuring, non-competes, and other predatory structures, wages suffered. For example,
multi-company franchising and the use of non-compete agreements for low-wage workers
causes wage suppression by restricting inter-firm mobility for workers. Charner and Fraser
report that these workers have high turnover; almost 50% were employed for less than a
year (Card & Kruger, 2016). This implies fast-food workers are not able to take advantage
of the intra-firm labor markets by advancing within a firm, nor are they able to move
between firms due to non-compete or no-poach agreements that restrict their postemployment opportunities (Corosa, 2019).
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Non-compete agreements are designed for highly paid, specifically skilled
individuals, and one in five American workers is subject to one of these agreements.
(Carosa, 2019). Using them for low-wage workers is predatory and senseless. Noncompete agreements are an innovative mechanism being used in low-wage sectors to limit
worker mobility in an exercise of monopsonistic behavior, which suppress wages by
making it illegal for a worker to cause intra-industry firms to compete for workers through
higher wages.
This section will show that the master of market power is the megacorporation,
where power over labor is housed within the corporate structure across business units,
supply chains, and industries. This section explains the history, rise, characteristics, and
innovations of the megacorporation, while identifying the megacorporation as a repository
for market power. Because the megacorp is an organization, focused on rapid expansion in
addition to profit maximization, it is a structure adept at accelerating accumulation.

The Corporation Defined
Although the corporation is integrated into modern society as an economic entity,
its original intent was not necessarily economic. The word corporation can be traced to the
Middle Ages where it was derived from the Latin word corpus meaning body, or corporare
meaning to form into a body (Culpepper, 2000). The word corporation originally referred
to an organic body of people joined together for a particular purpose. An example of the
corporation in one of its earliest forms is the Royal Charter company. Royal Charters were
an instrument of incorporation, granted by the Queen of England, which put an independent
legal personality on an organization where its objectives, constitution and powers were
defined so that it could govern its own affairs (Royal Charters, n.d.). Both the University
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of Cambridge and the University of Oxford are examples of Royal Charters with specific
purposes as places of scholarship. All entities incorporated and established by Royal
Charter were institutions that could not be established by individuals alone, with goals not
purely economic in nature.
While most incorporated entities established by Royal Charter were not purely
economic in character, some had economic purpose and came in the form of the joint-stock
company. These were a type of institution with economic goals that could not be
accomplished by an individual merchant or firm. The joint-stock company was organized
for:
Business undertakings requiring large amounts of capital. Money [for these
business undertakings] was raised by selling shares to investors, who became
partners in the venture. By law, individual shareholders were not responsible for
actions undertaken by the company, and, in terms of risk exposure, shareholders
could lose only the amount of their initial investment. (Nolen, 2010).
Joint-stock companies were required in situations where significant investment was
necessary, and where the benefit from the investment could be realized by more than a
single merchant.
Generally, merchants used partnership as the legal form for their financing and
distribution endeavors when possible. When they needed to pool large amounts of capital
for intensive projects, they brought in joint-stock companies for funds. The use of jointstock companies changed the character of merchant activities because they enabled the
establishment of major infrastructure and other costly endeavors while simultaneously
absolving single merchants of risk they would otherwise incur because the “individual”
carrying the risk was the joint-stock company itself. Joint-stock companies became large

29

institutions that were able to appropriate and accumulate vast amounts of wealth that would
have otherwise been inaccessible through partnership alone.
Joint-stock companies are different from the modern corporate structure known
today as the corporation, because joint-stock companies were purely financial, riskreducing institutions that did nothing specifically to innovate at the firm level. While
providing vast amounts of capital for major endeavors was undoubtedly transformative,
these transformations were occurring at the merchant level. Production remained craft
production. One of the earliest examples of a joint-stock company was the Virginia
Company, founded by the British in 1606 to colonize North America.4 Primitive
accumulation facilitated by the joint-stock company enabled the empire building and
territorial expansion of the British. Later examples of the use of the joint-stock company
include the establishment of logistics networks such as canals and much more
predominantly railroad companies, both of which were notable vehicles of primitive
accumulation that led to the corporation.

Formation of the Corporation in its modern form
As described in detail by Alfred Chandler (1977) in The Visible Hand, the
corporation known today first came into being in the 1840s and was fully formed by the
1920s. It firmly established itself as a new entity with a new set of rules and operating
paradigms, forever reshaping societal relations. In The Visible Hand, Alfred Chandler
(1977) refers to the modern corporation as the modern business enterprise, defined as firms
with “two specific characteristics: they must contain many distinct operating units and they

4

While ordinary merchants traded goods and financed the short-term logistics associated with this trading,
the first joint-stock company was a vehicle of state violence. The land allowing colonists settled was
expropriated from the Native Americans by extra-economic forces.
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must be managed by a hierarchy of salaried managers” (p.246). During the 1840s, many
firms expanded to multiple locations to increase output; diversified their product offerings;
or in the case of railroads, had very complicated operational requirements. The changing
nature of the firms was such that one owner could not oversee all activity. This meant that
a salaried manager or set of managers would be needed to coordinate the additional
activities or product lines. These additional factory locations or products can be referred to
as business units, where each business unit could operate independently as a separate entity
not connected by the corporation (Chandler, 1977). In the case of a manufacturing firm that
expanded from one factory building to two, each of the factories could operate
independently as separate businesses.5 However, the connectedness of the business units
within the corporate structure enabled corporations to vertically integrate and increase their
efficiencies. These efficiencies allowed for significant cost reduction, creating new
competitive dynamics where a limited number of firms could exist in a corporatized
industry. The creation of distinct operating units established the necessity for the
managerial class and its associated hierarchy (Chandler, 1977). The possible gains of
vertical integration inspired and incentivized a consolidation frenzy, that has continued to
the present day (Chandler, 1977). The consolidation bandwagon enabled a vast increase in
monopsonistic behavior reflected in major corporations today. The megacorporation’s
dominance is enforced by monopsonistic and monopolistic behavior, which in turn leads
to the continual rise of the profit share at the expense of the labor share.

5

It is also the case that a single owner could not oversee the operations of multiple factories at the same
time, making managers necessary.
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Eichner’s Megacorp
While it would be impossible to understand the corporate-structure of today without
considering the structures from which it evolved, it is also critical to evaluate the
differences of behavior and decision-making between the family-owned and operated firms
modern corporations incarnate. In the paper, “The Micro Foundations of the Corporate
Economy,” Alfred Eichner (1983) argues that “megacorps have behavior patterns at odds
with those of the atomistic firm” and argues that the megacorp is an important source of
decision making within the economy. Eichner asserts that megacorps and atomistic firms
both make decisions to select the quantity at which to produce and the price at which to
sell, but also makes the distinction that megacorps need to choose how much to invest and
how to finance that investment (1983). Eichner draws out the theoretical implications of
the differences between atomistic firms and the megacorp by categorizing atomistic firms
as “mom and pop” establishments and the megacorp as a modern corporation. This
distinction is contrasted from traditional economic theory where firms of all sizes behave
based on the same operating principles and decision-making framework articulated earlier
in this thesis. Because corporations emphasize long-term growth rather than short-term
profits, corporations need to consider the added questions of investment and finance due
to their more complicated structure.
In today’s economy, there are plenty examples of family-run firms or other small
businesses. These firms do not have sufficient monopsonistic and monopolistic power to
put upward pressure on the profit share and are not megacorps. Eichner (1983) explains
that the corporate economy consists of several industries that are a subset of the total
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production industries in the economy. These corporate industries interact with one another
by selling their output to each other, by buying inputs from one another, existing as a subset
of the larger “input-output system, with the industries represented by primary producers,
retail distributors and other non-corporate enterprises completing the system” (p.3). Some
corporations specialize in producing goods for final consumption while others specialize
in the production of capital goods used as inputs by other corporations. This is not a
characteristic unique to the megacorp. However, what is unique about the megacorp is that
regardless of the type of good produced, in each of the industries made up of megacorps,
the structure of the industry is oligopolistic, “with the four leading firms supplying 75% or
more of the industry’s output … [and] one of the four leading firms has a larger share of
the market than the others. It is the dominant firm and the industry price leader” (Eichner,
1983, p.3). These claims were true of the American railroad industry in the late 1800s, the
automobile industry of the mid 20th century, and are true today of countless industries
including aerospace and defense, agriculture, retail, technology, auto, health, and real
estate.
When four leading firms are supplying at least three-quarters of an industry’s
output, there are a limited number of employers for that industry, allowing for a high degree
of monopsonistic behavior. In this circumstance, there is both monopsonistic competition
where there is a limited number of employers buying labor power, and also oligopoly,
where there are a limited number of producers. The limited number of hiring firms
suppresses the wage due to depressed labor market power and lowered elasticity. The
presence of oligopoly means that there is imperfect competition and that the industry’s
firms are charging a markup on their products. The presence of a markup decreases the
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quantity produced, reducing the quantity of labor hired, and means that the market is
operating inefficiently.
In addition to the presence of oligopoly and the possibility that a single firm acts as
the industry and price leader, Eichner (1983) argues that because the megacorp is an
organization as opposed to an individual firm, decision-making and goals of the megacorp
are fundamentally different. Traditional firms are focused on maximization of surplusvalue or profit to accumulate capital, whereas corporations are focused on a series of other
metrics in addition to surplus-value maximization that expand and accelerate the
accumulation of capital or an increase in the profit share. Arguably, because this expands
their market power as monopsonistic firms, it makes the supply they face less elastic
because

suppliers

have

fewer

alternatives.

Eichner

(1983)

argues

that

the

megacorporation’s “goal is to expand at the highest rate possible, measured by the growth
of cash flow or some other correlate” (p.3). Evidence for this metric is bountiful, with the
compensation of many CEOs at least partially dependent on cash generated (Gong, G., Xie,
B., & Jiang, D., 2014).
To expand as quickly as possible, the megacorporation does two things. First, it
tries to retain its present share of the market in industries where it already belongs and
second, it systematically expands into newer, more quickly growing industries while
withdrawing from those where sales or profit have fallen below the desired rate. Due to the
size of corporations and deliberately crafted financial levers, they have much more
flexibility to do this than the traditional firm and can quickly overcome barriers to entry.
For example, if an atomistic firm is in the business of VHS production and the market shifts
away from VHSs to DVDs, it is very unlikely the atomistic firm would have adequate
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resources to switch production towards the new market. The firm would simply cease to
exist. The megacorporation, on the other hand, takes deliberate steps to ensure it is
immortal because it has sufficient access to funds to change their production from one
product to other.
The megacorp makes decisions through a managerial hierarchy, where the
executive group is at the top. The executive group is ultimately responsible for key
decisions including “the target rate of return on investment, the investment projects to be
included in the annual capital budget, the required mark-up, the annual increment in wages
and salaries, and any change in the amount of external debt” (Eichner, 1983, p.3). Eichner
highlights that the executive group is constrained only by the laws of the countries where
the corporation exists and by the threat of the possible loss of control to an outside group
if the financial performance of the company is poor. This gives the executive group
tremendous incentive to prioritize financial performance at all costs. This is especially true
if the megacorporation is publicly traded as executives have a fiduciary duty to maximize
value for shareholders.
Although the decision-making structure of the megacorp is more complicated and
specific than the existence of the salaried managerial class outlined by Alfred Chandler,
the sentiment is the same. Management structures need to be in place in order to ensure the
coordination and proper running of the corporation. The megacorp described by Eichner
and the corporation described Chandler are not fundamentally different. The main
distinction is that the contemporary megacorp is much more complex and innovative in
operating structure than the early corporation described by Chandler. The modern
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megacorporation has the incentive to spin out all real productive activity via outsourcing—
making it much nimbler when it comes to leaving one industry and entering another.
In David Weil’s book The Fissured Workplace, he details the systematic work of
corporations to shed non-core work via subcontract to other firms. These roles often
include security, information and technology, janitorial staff, and even more specialized
positions like financial analysts (Weil, 2014). Weil argues that this shedding is driven by a
race to the bottom for firm labor expenditure in effort to lower costs (Weil, 2014, p.77).
Subcontracted work generally goes to smaller companies that work for the megacorp. At
these smaller firms, labor law compliance is lower in addition to poorer quality benefits
(Weil, 2014, p.78). Weil (2014) points out that within the megacorporation, all workers are
paid within context of one another. Different roles have different pay bands, with higher
skilled jobs earning a higher paying range. Lower skill jobs earn higher compensation when
they are employed within the firm because of vertical equity between positions (Weil,
2014). This can be thought of in relation to wages as well as benefits offered. Once these
roles are subcontracted and no longer held within the megacorp, the pay penalty for
workers can be at least 15 percent with a significant increase in the probability of not having
benefits (Weil, 2014, pp.90-91). This is because the megacorp will compete contracts for
given work between smaller firms. These firms then engage in cut-throat competition to
win the subcontract, squeezing labor costs as low as possible in order to have the most
competitive contract. Further, because these workers are not within the firm, their
opportunities to move up the ladder are hampered, further suppressing their earning
potential (Weil, 2014). Thus, firms engage in monopsonistic behavior not only in directly
hiring workers, but also in awarding subcontracted work. It is still a situation of few buyers
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and many sellers. Megacorporations are directly responsible for the decline in the labor
share, illustrated clearly in their efforts to minimize labor input costs to the point of no
longer directly employing workers themselves. This causes a great distributional disparity
where the megacorporation maximizes profits using cheap subcontracted labor, and
smaller firms compete for work from megacorporations, driving the labor share down.
Like Chandler, Eichner also describes the megacorp as an operating structure with
many business units in each of the industries to which it belongs, with each business unit
or plant “embodying in the form of a fixed set of technical coefficients the least-cost
technology available at the time the plant was last constructed” (1983, p.3). He argues that
the megacorp ensures that it has some reserve capacity (25% of total capacity) always
available in case production needs to handle demand fluctuations due to new industry
entrants or a spike of unsatisfied demand (Eichner, 1983). Over the long run as new plants
are added, firms embed labor saving technology in order to maximize productivity and
decrease costs over time. The atomistic firm will not be able to build new production
facilities given its small nature and limited resources. This makes it very difficult for the
atomistic firm to incorporate new production efficiencies. Further, if the firm does expand,
it will face decreasing returns when it expands output beyond a certain point (Eichner,
1983). For this reason, in traditional economic thought, expansion of output is met by more
firms entering the industry. Given their vast quantity of resources, the megacorp can meet
growing demand and react to market shifts without facing increased competition. This
makes the likelihood of megacorporation disruption much smaller than the atomistic firm,
perpetuating its monopsonistic behavior. Both the corporation and the atomistic firm exist
within capitalism with the goal of making money, but the corporation has access to a vast
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quantity of resources and risk-mitigation that makes it possible to accumulate exponentially
more capital and therefore exponentially more wealth. As corporations continue to expand,
the surplus-value generated grows exponentially, while their character does not
fundamentally change. They are driven to make increasing amounts of money, rather than
maximize output. This restricts the quantity of output and the number of workers hired,
making society worse-off.
In traditional economic thinking, competition happens between firms while prices
are set by the market. When a firm is a price-taker, it is implied that it supplies a meager
portion of the total market supply. The firm’s owner and decision maker can only change
the quantity produced, accepting whatever price it brings. The price-taking assumption
requires that firms cannot trade short-term losses for long-term dominance, meaning it is
assumed predatory pricing is not present. When there only a few firms in a given industry,
the same intuition does not apply. This is because firms set prices rather than the markets.
The goal of the corporation is to achieve the highest possible rate of expansion rather than
to maximize short-run profit. When firms set prices, they affix a certain mark-up to their
unit costs. With the funds generated from the market, the firm either invests into itself or
takes the money as pure surplus-value. Investment, pricing, and finance decisions are
interrelated within the corporate behavior model (Eichner, 1983). This was the case with
corporations that existed at the turn of the century, and it is still true today.6

6

The capitalist corporation is capital becoming more adequate to its concept. Capitalism destroyed private
property in its original form by centralizing the means of production while socializing labor. Corporations
depend on each-other, and laborers depend on corporations. Exploitation today has a different character
than it did in turn of the century factories, but workers are still alienated from their own labor power and
society is controlled. For example, the salaried class of workers, as well as many hourly wage laborers, no
longer work only eight hours per day. Many workers work longer hours as long as the weekly total adds to
forty. Salaried workers often work much more than forty hours a week without extra compensation because
they are not subject to the same fair labor standards laws. When workers toil for greater than eight hours at
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Corporations today span many states and countries, producing a variety of products
in oligopolistic industries. There are clear price leaders and takers, and the American
government has enabled extreme consolidation in many industries. A perfect case study of
this is the Boeing Corporation, which is the only remaining American large commercial
aircraft manufacturer. The only other company that can produce similar aircraft in the
world is the European equivalent—Airbus. Boeing has thousands of suppliers, hundreds of
which are other corporations, and thousands more that behave like traditional firms
(Cameron, 2020). These supply chain dynamics make notions of competition a farce, given
Boeing’s monopsonistic behavior.
Although the corporation wove itself into an oligopolistic network of industries,
and structure of the corporation has not fundamentally changed, the complexity and
innovation of corporate operating has grown significantly. For Chandler, the salaried
managerial class and multiple business units are the key differentiators between a firm and
a corporation, and these are still the traits that indicate the delineation. A structure with
origins around 1840, which spread through the contagion of consolidation, embraced
predatory structures like subcontracting, franchising, and harmful non-compete
agreements, that are responsible for the imperfect competition and runaway monopsonistic
behavior seen today. The net effect of fewer firms, and those few firms having everincreasing control and dominance, is the decline in the labor share. This decline is reflected
with suppressed wages, particularly in lower skilled workers, and a simultaneous increase
in the profit share enabled by monopolistic behavior.

a given time, it is known that efficiency is lost. Productivity has diminishing returns at that point. And yet,
many corporations require this of their workers. Requirements of these types helps the corporation maintain
power.
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Chapter 4: The Declining Labor Share
Although the megacorporation existed in the 20th century, and its origins before
that, innovation on the part of monopsonistic megacorporations beginning in the 1970s
enabled greater rent extraction from workers. The main vehicle for this rent extraction is
by way of wage suppression and failing to reinvest. As show in Figure 10, starting in 1970,
the labor share of income began to decline, and that decline accelerated significantly after
2000. The decline in the labor share emphasizes that the labor market, and correspondingly
wage-determination, is not behaving efficiently, leading to exploitation and a worsening of
conditions for the American workforce.

Figure 10: Declining Labor Income Share in the United States. Reprinted from Aum, S., and Shin, Y. (2020). Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, Fourth Quarter 2020, 102(4), pp. 413-28
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Because total output can be thought of as a tradeoff between labor and capital; or
labor, capital, and profit, a decrease in one factor causes an increase in another and vice
versa. There is a significant body of work drawing on this relationship to explain the decline
in labor share over the past sixty years, claiming that increases in the capital share are to
blame. Some of this research includes but is not limited to research from Zeira (1998),
Acemoglu (2003), Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) and Piketty and Zucman (2014)
(Aum, S., and Shin, Y., 2020). The two-factor production function states that 𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿),
where Y is the total output produced, and F is a function with a homogeneity-of-degree-1
with two inputs of capital (K) and labor (L) (Aum, S., and Shin, Y., 2020). The notion that
the labor and capital shares are thought of as a trade-off where a decrease in the capital
share will cause an increase in the labor share and vice versa is called the capital-to-labor
!

ratio. In order for this capital-to-labor ratio ( " ) to hold, the elasticity of substitution
between labor and capital must be greater than 1. The glaring issue with this body of work
is that it does not include the mark-up or profit share due to the assumption of homogeneity.
In the paper, “Declining Labor and Capital Shares,” Simcha Barkai (2016) argues
that the well-documented decline in the labor share is not offset by a change in capital share
but is rather driven by an increase in the profit-share or rents due to imperfect competition,
realized by industry consolidation. Barkai is able to come to this conclusion because he
departs from the homogeneity assumption, which allows for profit to be included in the
equation. Once profit is included in the model, the relationship for shares of gross value
added for the U.S, economy is 1 = 𝑆#" + 𝑆#! + 𝑆#$ (Barkai, 2016). Based on ratios from the
gross value added equation, an increase in the profit share can reduce output while
inefficiently decreasing the labor and/or capital shares. “I construct profits as the difference
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between gross value added and the sum of labor costs, capital costs, and indirect taxes on
production…Profits are constructed as a residual that measures the dollars left over from
production after firms pay all measured costs of production” (Barkai, 2016, p.10).7 Figure
11 “shows the profit share of gross value added for the U.S. non-financial corporate sector
over the period 1984-2014” where “capital payments are the product of the required rate
of return on capital and the value of capital stock” (Barkai, 2016, p.34).

Figure 11: Increasing Profit-Share from 1984-2014. Reprinted from Barkai, S. (2016). Declining Labor and Capital
Shares. New Working Paper Series No. 2.

This is useful when considering the health of the labor market because it shows that there
is inefficient behavior in the aggregate market. “Measured in percentage terms, the decline
in the capital share (30%) is much more dramatic than the decline in the labor share (10%)”
(Barkai, 2016, p.3). Profit was not reinvested into the capital or labor share by either
making technological or other capital improvements or by raising worker compensation.
Instead, the earnings were retained as profit.
As discussed earlier, it is difficult to account for the gross value added of certain
industries, primarily the Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and other service sectors. This
means that capital payments for this portion of the economy are “unobserved.” Barkai
7

The profit Share of gross value added
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(2016) estimates the unobserved stock of capital using multiple methods and finds that in
order for the increase in the profit share to be offset, the unobserved stock of capital would
need to grow by 490 percent or $42 trillion in 2014. For perspective, this is thirty times
higher than estimates of unobserved capital stock by other economists and three times
higher than the value of observed capital (Barkai, 2016). This finding shows that the claim
by some economists that the decline in labor share is attributed to the increase in the capital
share is far-fetched. Further, using data on industry concentration as a proxy for the markup, Barkai (2016) uses univariate regression to show that the decline in labor share can be
accounted for by the increase in industry consolidation. Again, the decline in the labor
share is not due to an off-setting increase in the capital share, but rather due to an increase
in industry consolidation and correspondingly, mark-up pricing. In consolidated industries,
it is known that the megacorporation is the structure at work.
Moreover, it is necessary to point out that in addition to monopolistic behavior,
firms also exhibit monopsonistic behavior that depresses the labor share through the wage
markdowns. The results are consistent with price-setting mechanisms such as “barriers to
entry, where prices are the result of monopolistic competition. An increase in barriers to
entry results in higher concentration driven by a decline in the labor share” (Barkai, 2016).
In previous sections of this thesis, imperfect competition as well as the rise in industry
consolidation via the mechanism of the megacorporation was discussed, and the structures
driving the vast increase in the profit-share explained. This section provides evidence for
the decline in the labor share and argues that through rents gained from imperfect
competition, the profit share has correspondingly increased.
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Chapter 5: Neoclassical and Mainstream Wage-Determination
Model Review
This section articulates and identifies the power imbalance nested within most labor
contracts that leads to low wage offers and unfair distribution of payoffs generated from
successful

job-matches.

Textbook

neoclassical

economics

characterizes

wage

determination as a decision made by an employer and a worker in response to the supply
of labor and the expected value added from the interaction. Power on the part of the worker
or the firm is not considered as part of the model. This is because they are modeled as
complete contracts instead of incomplete contracts, which is an inadequate representation
of the interaction. The main line of wage determination models in mainstream economics
is that of search and match models, which are focused not on how the payoff of a match is
determined and distributed, but rather the circumstances of search and situations when
there may be a failure to match. Generally, search and match models fail to address the
asymmetric power between the firm and the worker because they were designed to evaluate
macroeconomic employment levels rather than microeconomic interactions. Despite their
inadequacy and short comings, search models can be connected to the megacorporation
because they can be extended to show monopsonistic interactions.
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Further, this section investigates the reasons for wage suppression and the declining
labor share, with wage-determination models addressed at the microeconomic level. Wage
determination models evaluated in this section include one-shot games, simple search
models and more complex variations, the Diamond Mortenson Pissarides Model, and the
labor contract articulated by Bowles and Halliday. Bowles and Halliday articulate the
principal-agent relationship, which is much more useful for thinking about wage
determination than search and match models. In this relationship, the principal has power
over the agent and there is a conflict of interest between the parties. Principals in exchanges
have both wealth and power, and they leverage their power to maintain this position which
is realized as monopsonistic behavior. While this relationship is also true of the parties
undergoing search and match, the search and match models were not designed to reflect
this power differential.
In the introductory, mainstream economics textbook model of unemployment, a
worker is unemployed because she has not found a wage that is high enough to incentivize
her to work. In the labor-leisure tradeoff, there is a distribution of wages, and people that
are unemployed choose to leisure because they have not found jobs with high enough
wages to incentivize them to work. Some criticism of the labor-leisure framework it that it
is a simple model that does not explain long-term unemployment, under-employment, or
other involuntary unemployment. Long-term unemployment refers to workers who are
unemployed for at least a year and under employment is defined as workers who are
working part-time but are willing and able to work at full-time capacity (OECD, 2021).
Further, the labor-leisure trade-off assumes jobs have flexibility where it is likely absent.
As an example, most full-time jobs require at least forty hours per week of work, while
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some workers may find it optimal to work less than forty hours. Immediate shortcomings
of this framework are as follows: workers do not have perfect information of all job
postings, may be geographically bound to a given set of jobs and wages, have limited
flexibility, and will not find a job “match” from all opportunities. Further, it is also known
that employers behave in ways that reduce labor market competition, such as by
implementing non-compete agreements and other restrictive stipulations on their
employees. These behaviors do not fit into the textbook framework, as power is exogenous
to the model. This section will show that due to a conflict of interest and power imbalance
between the worker and employer, employers markdown wages to lower rates than would
otherwise be paid in competitive markets. Moreover, employers have power over workers
because they can choose not to match with a worker, set the wage level, and can terminate
the worker if they so choose.

Agent Decision-Making & The Search Model Framework
Even though power is not a consideration of search and match models, this class of
models provides insight as to how some economists think about worker-employer
interactions. The basic framework of search models involves an employer searching for an
employee to fill an open position, while an unemployed worker looking to fill a position
searches for an employer. Agent wage negotiation strategy is a helpful backdrop to the
search model framework because it sheds light on the dilemma that underpins the
interaction. This is laid out in the following sections with a discussion of Nash equilibrium;
complete and incomplete contracts and their influence on labor contracts; and the principalagent relationship, where there is a conflict of interest between the principal and agent that
informs the strategy and decision-making of both parties.
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Decision Making Framework: Nash Equilibrium and the Wage-offer
In game theory, strategic-interactions include rational decision-makers attempting
to maximize their individual payoff. When modeled as games, one can determine the most
likely outcome, or equilibrium, by examining each player’s basket of strategies. The Nash
equilibrium is defined as the mutual best response by rational players. Hal Varian (1992)
elaborates by saying Nash equilibrium “is a certain kind of rational expectations
equilibrium…[where] each player correctly [foresees] how likely the other player is to
make various choices, and the beliefs of the two players are mutually consistent” (p.265).
Because each agent anticipates that other players will make utility maximizing choices,
players will not find it in their best interest to deviate unilaterally from a Nash equilibrium
strategy (Varian, 1992). An outcome is considered Pareto optimal if one party cannot be
made better off without making another worse off. Conversely, an outcome is Pareto
inferior if a party can be made better off without making another worse off. Job-matches
are often Nash equilibriums with Pareto inferior outcomes.
Applying the idea of Nash equilibrium to search theory, employers want to pay as
little as possible (in order to minimize their production costs), and workers know that the
firm’s strategy is to minimize the wage offer. Meanwhile, workers want to maximize their
wage while minimizing effort or intensity. In a one-shot wage-offer game, the worker
knows the firm will not offer a higher wage, nor will the worker accept a lower wage.
Imperfectly competitive labor markets reflect this logic as most wage-offers are treated as
one-shot games, meaning there is no opportunity for negotiation. These characteristics of
the wage-offer directly relate to the decline in the labor share, motivated by powerful firms
that are often megacorporations.
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The Employment Contract
When making a hire, a firm agrees to pay a worker a certain wage in exchange for
their labor time. This labor contract can be complete or incomplete. When a contract is
complete, all aspects of the exchange are guaranteed, and the contract is legally enforceable
at close to no cost to the involved parties (Bowles, S. and Halliday, S., 2020). For a labor
contract to be complete, the employer must have perfect information about the quality of
work and output of a given worker.
Bowles and Halliday (2020) argue that most contracts are incomplete for a variety
of factors, including non-verifiable information, time, measurability, enforcement
authority, and enforcement motivation. Many aspects of jobs are not easily measurable. Of
course, there are degrees of measurability ranging from the rate at which Amazon
warehouse workers pack boxes to the abstract nature of the services sectors most notably
including Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (FIRE). The introduction of this thesis
explored wage determination for task-based wages on the Amazon Mechanical Turk
platform and showed monopsonistic behavior in combination with some mis-optimization
frictions caused inefficient bunching (Dube et al., 2018). Also, Foley (2011) found that the
presence of the FIRE sector and other services sectors in his model disrupted Okun’s Law
between unemployment and output. These papers illustrate that different jobs and
industries have varying levels of measurability and motivation to monitor workers, and
therefore varying levels of contract enforceability, all of which impact the wage offer. This
variance drives up the power of the employer and the magnitude of rents that can be
collected.
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If and when effort is unobservable, the power held by workers increases. It is more
socially acceptable for lower skill jobs such as warehouse workers or retail cashiers to have
their output closely monitored while monitoring is far less accepted in higher skill roles.
Even if most or all aspects of a given job are measurable, it can be regarded as intrusive,
not cost effective, or not desirable to measure these aspects (Bowles, S., and Halliday, S.,
2020). For a salaried accountant, a firm could track hours spent “logged-in” per day, but it
would be much more resource intensive to have all of the activities of the worker
monitored. It would likely take another worker to monitor the accountant and all the while,
the value of what that worker was creating would be imputed after-the-fact anyway. The
monitored accountant would feel further alienated from her own labor as the firm could
not trust her to do her job without monitoring. If workers are subject to surveillance, they
may distrust their employer. The cost of distrust coupled with the cost of surveillance itself
would likely be much higher than the payoff of employee monitoring. This is an example
where observability is possible but not a cost-effective or socially acceptable use of
resources. Social norms and the cost of observation correspond to the motivation to enforce
contracts (Bowles, S., and Halliday, S., 2020). To a degree, the level of incompleteness of
a contract is a matter of choice for the parties involved. Unobserved and/or immeasurable
parameters, even if unobserved by choice, obfuscate the mechanisms by which wages are
determined and impact the power held by each party.

Firm and worker dynamics: Principal-agent relationship
Regardless of completeness, all contracts are 1) based on the mutual expectation of
gain by the involved parties, and 2) have a conflict of interest over the way that these gains
are divided (Bowles, S. and Halliday, S., 2020). Bowles and Halliday (2020) define the
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principal-agent relationship as a problem that arises when there both is a conflict of interest
between the two parties and an incomplete contract. An example of a conflict of interest
between the two parties, also noted by Joan Robinson (1969), is the firm wishing for the
worker to be more productive, while the worker wishes to save her energy. In the case of
the salaried working class, the firm wishes for the worker to make the working day as long
as possible, and according to the Fair Labor Standards Act, salaried workers are exempt
from overtime pay in most states (U.S. Department of Labor, n.d.). The worker, on the
other hand, wishes to shorten the working day. In this case, the firm cannot enforce the
quality of work done by the worker throughout the day. This drives contractual
incompleteness and motivates the firm’s desire for the working day to be as long as
possible. The firm has the upper hand and is the party in the relationship with the power
because the employer can terminate the employment contract. In contrast to the Diamond,
Mortenson, and Pissarides search models discussed in the following section, Bowles and
Halliday (2020) argue that the employment contract is a repeated game rather than a single
match. They argue that the principal, or employer, has the option to not renew the
relationship, or can fire the employee, depending on the available information the employer
has on the employee’s job performance. This is known as the termination threat, which
gives the principal power over the agent because they control the contract. The agent wants
to continue the contract to continue to earn wages to survive. These distinguishing
characteristics make the Bowles & Halliday models much more useful in thinking about
worker-employer interactions than search and match models.
When considering the value of the transaction to the agent, one must consider the
utility the agent gets from each period, the length of employment, and the agent’s fallback
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option should the principal terminate the contract (Bowles, S., and Halliday, S., 2020).
Unsurprisingly, as discussed in the labor-leisure trade-off, the payoff to the agent needs to
be higher than the agent’s fallback option. In the case of a worker, the level of pay and
compensation needs to be higher than the unemployment, residual wealth, or other
compensation the worker may receive if she was unemployed. The excess value of the
transaction to the agent over and above the fallback option is called enforcement rent
(Bowles, S., and Halliday, S., 2020). The fear, or disutility, of losing the enforcement rent
makes the agent act in the principal’s interest. It is considered “rent” because the payoff is
preferable to the next best alternative and “enforcement rent” because it motivates the agent
to take action to maintain the contract and continue to collect the rent. Moreover, the
principal tries to minimize the cost of production inputs—labor cost is an input. The
principal must also decide the quantity of labor to purchase, which leads to restricted
employment opportunities, giving the termination threat teeth. There is a conflict of interest
because the surplus of production, or the profit from enterprise, is not shared with the
worker.
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Figure 12: Individual best-response function and Nash equilibrium. Reprinted from Bowles, S., & Halliday, S. (2021).
Microeconomics: Competition, Conflict and Coordination. Oxford University Press. Unpublished Manuscript.

The principal is constrained by the agent’s best-response function. As illustrated in
Figure 12 at point n, the Nash equilibrium occurs at the point of tangency of the isocost ray
and the best response function (Bowles, S., and Halliday, S., 2020). This is the point at
which work quality is maximized and price is minimized, while accounting for the agents
best-response function. The allocation is a Nash equilibrium because it is the mutual best
response of both parties, even though the principal dictates the contract terms. However,
the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal because the contract is incomplete (Bowles, S.,
and Halliday, S., 2020). The measurement and enforcement problems associated with
wage-determination are pervasive and can impact the distribution of the gains generated
from employment. In many cases, the worker is on the losing end, which has led to the
decline in the labor share and corresponding wage suppression.
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Power of the Principal in the Principal-agent relationship
Bowles and Halliday (2020) argue that power held by the principal is motivated by
an imbalance of supply and demand. The key feature of the equilibrium of these contracts
is that principals transact with agents who receive economic enforcement rents and prefer
the current transaction to their next best alternative (Bowles, S., and Halliday, S., 2020). In
the labor market, there is some population of unemployed workers that have failed to
match. If there were no unemployed workers due to a labor shortage, a worker that was
fired could theoretically find employment rapidly and could easily move from one firm to
another, or quickly transition from unemployed to employed. A distinction can be drawn
from search models, which claim workers encounter costs to undergo a search for
employment, and there is no guarantee that their wages and enforcement rents will be as
high as their previous job. It is most often the case that there is a limited set of employers,
which are often megacorporations or firms with subcontracts from megacorporations, that
use their power to restrict the quantity of labor they hire and implement a markdown on
wages.

Nash equilibrium in the case of complete contracts
Although complete contracts do not reflect most jobs in the labor market, they
operate outside the principal-agent relationship. Complete contracts do not require the firm
to pay the worker an enforcement rent, as the contract is enforceable by definition. If a
contract is complete, the principal is not constrained by the agent’s best-response function,
but rather by the worker’s participation constraint (Bowles, S., and Halliday, S., 2020). A
complete contract strips away the conflict of interest from the transaction as quality,
productivity, and other factors can be enforced by the contract (Bowles, S., and Halliday,
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S., 2020). Price and quality are controlled by the firm, and the worker can take or leave the
offer. Oppositely, in the situation of an incomplete contract, the firm can only control price
because quality is unenforceable. From the definition of a complete contract, it is clear that
the basic search models of Diamond, Mortenson, and Pissarides are based on enforceable
transactions and are complete contracts.
In the case of complete contracts, the market clears because there are no
enforcement rents. This means that if a party refuses an offer, there is another opportunity
to immediately secure the match elsewhere or that the match was not at least as good as
the fallback option (Bowles, S., and Halliday, S., 2020). As shown in Figure 13, a complete
contract is transacted at point c, whereas an incomplete contract is transacted at point n.
The quality is the same as in the incomplete contracting case, but the firm pays half the
price. This means that there is no incentive to pay the worker more than her participation
constraint as is reflected in the search models discussed of Diamond, Mortenson, and
Pissarides. This shows that in situations where aspects of the job are harder to measure,
workers more easily get a larger share of the payoff. However, even if workers are getting
a larger portion of the payoff, they may be being exploited by significant overtime hours
or poor working conditions.
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Figure 13: Agent Best-response function and the Participation constraint. Reprinted from Bowles, S., & Halliday, S.
(2020). Microeconomics: Competition, Conflict and Coordination. Oxford University Press. Unpublished Manuscript.

Search and Match Models
This subsection investigates the declining labor share and suppressed wages
through search and match models. Models evaluated in this section include simple search
models, more complex variations, and the Diamond Mortenson Pissarides Model. These
models were developed to understand the labor market on the aggregate, as opposed to
individual interactions, which make them relatively weak tools for evaluating wage
determination.

One-shot Wage-offer Distribution Model
Pissarides expanded the basic search model, where a worker accepts a job based on
satisfaction with the wage offered, to include the concept of matching. Matching
incorporates both the worker and the firm finding an acceptable match before accepting a
job or making a hire, respectively. Pissarides (2011) used this framework to build an
equilibrium theory that encompasses a variety of factors into the search model including
requirements, location, and differences in the institutional structure of labor markets. The
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addition of matching into search theory incorporates the job opportunities available to the
worker and the set of workers available for a given job. Pissarides (2011) defines labor
market frictions as when a worker or firm may find it difficult to find a match. Examples
include coordination frictions between workers and firms, as well as skill mismatches that
arise by virtue of some workers having more or different skills, while firms are
simultaneously searching for workers with specific sets of skills.
Simple search and match models assume no wage variability, with job matches
occurring either randomly or with the help of an unemployment agency. These models
factor in search costs both for the worker as well as the firm, with higher costs imputed on
searching through an agency rather than through the private job market. It takes time and
effort for workers to find job opportunities, while it costs firms resources to hire a
satisfactory employee (Albrecht, 2011). Productivity is an exogenous parameter from the
simple search and match model and other wage factors are treated exogenously (Pissarides,
2011).

Different Branches of Search Models and their Relationship to the Wage-offer
Diving deeper, search theory literature can be divided into two main branches. In
the first branch, “the wage-offer distribution is modeled at the equilibrium outcome of a
wage-posting game played by firms…each firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to job
applicants” (Albrecht, 2011). Firms have the advantage in this branch of models because
they take into account the distribution of wage offers posted by all firms in the market as
well as reservation-wage strategies of workers. Workers are not motivated to reject wageoffers due to the opportunity cost of continuing to search, and firms are not incentivized to
offer higher pay because they know the reservation wage. Because the wage-offer
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distribution model effectively minimizes the role of any intangible parameter, the
reservation wage is the most important factor of wage determination.
When looking at wage determination factors of wage-posting models, one must
consider the Diamond paradox. The paradox model examines wage offers that are drawn
at a fixed rate from a known distribution (Albrecht, 2011). Workers and firms are assumed
to be homogenous, while productivity, search costs, and the value of leisure time are
exogenous to the model (Albrecht, 2011). Because all workers sample from the same wage
distribution, they face an identical reservation wage, R (Albrecht, 2011). If all firms
identically offer R, the wage-offer distribution curve will change, shifting the common
worker reservation wage to a lower value. In the paradox, this continues until all firms offer
the Diamond monopsony wage, which is equal to the value of leisure time—the lowest
wage a worker will accept (Albrecht, 2011). This paradox comes from the time cost of
search, which is a market friction, moving the equilibrium wage from a competitive level
to a monopsonistic one. Moreover, the Diamond paradox argues that small market frictions
can have a disproportionately large impact on market equilibriums. For workers without
much of a fallback option, the reservation wage can be extremely low. When low
reservation wages are combined with jobs where output is easily measured, wage-offers
can degenerate to reflect the Diamond paradox, with wages equal to the minimum wage (if
firms comply with labor laws). When workers will accept almost any wage and there is
little incentive for inter-firm competition, the result is monopsonistic behavior with power
concentrated in the hands of industry dominating firms, which are often megacorporations.
Many economists have attempted to resolve the Diamond paradox, with one of the
more fundamental solutions coming from Burdett and Mortensen. Their model features
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unemployed and employed job seekers, which adds more elements of the real job market
to the model (Burdett, K., and Mortenson, D., 1998). The reservation wage for employed
job seekers is their current wage, implying that the distribution of reservation wages across
job seekers may not be homogenous. The heterogeneity of reservation wages indicates that
when a job seeker contacts a firm, the firm does not know whether it is in competition with
another firm, supporting equilibrium wage dispersion because the distribution is no longer
degenerate.
Additionally, Burdett and Mortensen observe that more productive firms are able
to pay higher wages (Burdett, K., and Mortenson, D., 1998). They arrive to this conclusion
by arguing that more productive firms have larger workforces, make more profit, and tend
to have less worker attrition than less productive firms. Moreover, Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) claim that the existence of productivity differences and matching frictions together
explain cross-firm and inter-industry wage differentials. However, bigger, more profitable
firms do not necessarily share the increased profitability with the worker through wages.
This idea is interconnected with Alfred Eichner’s concept of the megacorporation and
corroborated by David Weil in The Fissured Workplace. Monopolistic firms have greater
market share and profitability, allowing them to pay workers higher wages with added rents
at the expense of unemployed workers and workers pushed outside of the firm.
Megacorporations have innovated to outsource the least productive elements of their
workforce, meaning that they have a smaller pool of what they consider to be higher
productivity workers to pay (Weil, 2014). This is key because the distribution of these
payoffs, and the conflict of interest regarding their distribution, is reflected in the declining
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labor share of income and the simultaneous rise in the profit share, all of which are left
exogenous in search and match models.

The Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model
In the simple Diamond-Mortenson-Pissarides model, the surplus gained from a
match is exogenous (Diamond, 1982). The Diamond (1982) Mortensen (1982) Pissarides
(1985) model takes a labor demand-side view of unemployment, contrary to earlier offer
arrival models. The central purpose of the Diamond-Mortenson-Pissarides model is to
describe the natural rate of unemployment; wage determination is not considered. In its
simplest form, there are no problems about offers being rejected. Rather, unemployment
duration is determined by the time it takes a worker to get an offer, and the arrival rate of
offers is determined by the number of positions for which firms are hiring (Albrecht, 2011).
In the model, when a worker and firm match, the mutual party gets a payoff. The model
assumes that the division of the payoff is determined by Nash bargaining, thus informing
the wage and the profit withheld by the firm. The model features a “job creation condition,”
where the firm decreases its willingness to hire as the wage rises (Albrecht, 2011).
Many economists have attempted to extend the Diamond-Mortenson-Pissarides
model to answer questions on wage determination, albeit from a complete contract
perspective. Shimer generalizes the Burdett-Mortensen wage-posting assumption to the
Diamond-Mortenson-Pissarides bargaining environment to eliminate the Nash bargaining
solution.
Shimer (2006) shows that if the wage is bargained over once and for all at the time
of match formation and remains fixed for the duration of the match…the wage
therefore does more than simply determine how match surplus is divided; it also
affects the size of the surplus by affecting expected match duration. (Albrecht,
2011).
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When Nash bargaining is eliminated from the model, it opens the doors for more factors
and bargaining mechanisms to determine the wage. The model no longer necessitates
perfect knowledge of each player’s strategy.
Because the Diamond-Mortenson-Pissarides model does not precisely define the
way in which the surplus generated from a match is shared between the worker and the
firm, the efficiency of equilibrium in the model has been investigated extensively. Hosios
(1990) provides a general condition on the efficient allocation of the surplus by setting the
firm’s share of the surplus equal to the elasticity of the matching function. It is merely
coincidence if the wage-offer is equal to the Hosios value. This is because there is no
mechanism to make sure this ‘optimal’ surplus share is divided in any specific way. The
employer has little incentive to share any surplus with the worker beyond what is necessary
and there is no regulatory framework mandating the surplus be divided efficiently or
equitably.
The Diamond-Mortenson-Pissarides model provides a useful tool for understanding
aggregate unemployment, linking labor-market policy and aggregate labor-market
outcomes. Extensions of the model point toward the problem of monopsony power
determining wage, but questions of measurability and enforcement continue to persist.
Bowles and Halliday (2020) add insight here by noting:
The combined effect of incomplete contracts and conflicts of interest is that the
determination of the allocation resulting from an exchange depends on who
exercises what kind of powers in the transaction. Power in the firm is generally
exercised by those who hold what are called the residual rights of control, meaning
the right to determine what is not specified contractually… Those with wealth are
more likely to be able to become principals in the principal-agent relationship. As
actors on the short side of markets that do not clear, principals exercise power over
agents and they benefit from the first mover advantage that their power confers.
Wealth and power are concentrated in the same hands, even in an environment of
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competitive markets in which the powerful cannot secure participations in
exchanges by coercion. (pp.823-826).
Search models are directly connected to the megacorporation because the parties involved
are the principal and the agent. Broadly, search models leave the distribution of the payoff
from a match between the parties as exogenous, and Bowles and Halliday show that the
distribution of the payoff is unequal due to conflicting interests and imbalanced power.
Principals in exchanges have both wealth and power, and they leverage their power to
maintain this position which is realized as monopsonistic behavior.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Using the labor productivity/compensation gap as motivation, this thesis argues that
the decline in the labor share and associated wage suppression is caused by a significant
increase in the profit share, made possible by the rise, empowerment and innovations of
the megacorporation. Textbook neoclassical economics characterizes wage determination
as an optimal decision made by an employer and a worker in response to the supply of
labor and the expected value added from the interaction. Power on the part of the worker
or the firm is treated as exogenous, and the employment contract is treated as complete.
First, this thesis outlines empirical evidence that there are measurement challenges
in the labor market that translate to bunched wages, imputed productivity calculations, and
opportunities for profits to be distributed unfairly or inefficiently. It then uses the real
minimum wage over time to highlight the lack of labor policy over the past fifty years, that
has led to wage suppression, a decline in the labor share, and the rise in the profit share.
Second, this thesis explains monopsony and monopsonistic behavior, drawing on
the works of Joan Robinson and Alan Manning. The major takeaway and connection to the
main argument of this section is that monopsonistic behavior is realized as a power
imbalance between firms and workers, where firms have the upper hand. Many models use
perfect competition as a starting point; Joan Robinson (1969) highlights that it is more
appropriate to begin analysis at imperfect competition, meaning policies need to be
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implemented to rebalance power rather than eliminate intervention to prop up the edge case
of perfect competition. Further, this section makes the connection between monopsonistic
behavior and monopolistic behavior, which often go hand-in-hand as an imperfectly
competitive market tends to be so both on the buy and sell sides. The end result is both a
markdown on labor power purchased, and a markup on output sold.
Third, this thesis identifies the master of market power as the megacorporation,
where power over labor is housed within the corporate structure across business units,
supply chains, and industries. By leveraging the works of Chandler, Eichner, and Weil, this
section connects to the thesis argument by explaining the history, rise, characteristics, and
innovations of the megacorporation, while identifying the megacorporation as a repository
for market power. The megacorporation is a power repository because of its unique
characteristics. Because the megacorp is an organization, focused on rapid expansion in
addition to profit maximization, it is a structure adept at accelerating accumulation.
Because this behavior expands their market power as monopsonistic and monopolistic
firms, it makes the supply they face less elastic because suppliers have fewer alternatives.
Monopsonistic and monopolistic behaviors complement one another, and reinforce the
megacorporation’s dominance, which in turn leads to the continual rise of the profit share
at the expense of the labor share.
Fourth, this thesis draws on the work of Barkai to show the decline in the labor
share is explainable by a rise in the profit share, as opposed to a rise in the capital share.
This is made possible by the rise and innovations of the megacorporation that has
systematically consolidated, marked-up pricing, implemented wage markdowns, and shed
workers from inside its walls to just beyond, leading to fewer benefits and lower pay. As a
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result, the megacorporation is able to generate rents from imperfect competition, which
manifest as a rise in the profit share. The decline in the labor share emphasizes that the
labor market is failing, leading to exploitation and a worsening of conditions for the
American workforce.
Finally, this thesis articulates the labor contract and identifies the power imbalance
nested within most labor contracts that leads to low wage offers and payoffs being unfairly
distributed. Textbook neoclassical economics characterizes wage determination as a
decision made by an employer and a worker in response to the supply of labor and the
expected value added from the interaction. Power on the part of the worker or the firm is
not considered as part of the model. This is due to the fact that they are modeled as complete
contracts instead of incomplete contracts. The main line of wage determination models in
mainstream economics is that of search and match models, which are focused not on how
the payoff of a match is determined and distributed, but rather the circumstances of search
and situations when there may be a failure to match. Generally, search and match models
fail to address the asymmetric power between the firm and the worker. Hosios (1990)
attempts to articulate an efficient allocation of the surplus, but it comes with no
enforcement mechanism. Employers have power over workers because they can choose
not to match with a worker, set the wage level, and can terminate the worker if they so
choose. Search models are directly connected to the megacorporation because the parties
involved are the principal and the agent, and most often, megacorporations are the
principal. Principals in exchanges have both wealth and power, and they leverage their
power to maintain this position which is realized as monopsonistic behavior.
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Due to the rise in monopsony power and the active role of the megacorporation to
suppress wages, the labor share in the United States has steadily decreased. There is ample
evidence that firms do not pay efficient wages nor are they sure of the efficient wage level.
It is also clear that most firms will pay workers the lowest wages possible regardless of
productivity or output. The Economic Policy Institute recently published an article by
Mishel and Bivens (2021) titled “Identifying the policy levers generating wage suppression
and wage inequality” that discusses the policy implications that contributed to wage
suppression and what can be done. In the article, Mishel and Bivens (2021) argue:
…the divorce between the growth of median compensation and productivity, the
inequality of compensation, and the erosion of labor’s share of income has been
generated primarily through intentional policy decisions designed to suppress
typical workers’ wage growth, the failure to improve and update existing policies,
and the failure to thwart new corporate practices and structures aimed at wage
suppression… Inequality will stop rising, and paychecks for typical workers will
start rising robustly in line with productivity, only when we enforce labor
standards and embrace policies that reestablish individual and collective
bargaining power for workers.
Mishel and Bivens (2021) articulate the lack of action by policymakers allowed for wages
to be suppressed and for the labor share to decline, as articulated in this thesis.
In order for wages to rise for the 90% of Americans that have had their wages
suppressed, policy action needs to be taken (Mishel, L., & Bivens, J., 2021). The lowest
hanging fruit to address wage suppression would be to increase the federal minimum wage
for the first time in more than ten years. Another policy action that would improve wage
outcomes would be to address the fissuring of corporations addressed by David Weil
(2014), including enforcing labor standards and ensuring worker protections. Finally,
policy actions to hamper monopsonistic power by corporations are essential to address the
power imbalance in the labor market. There is evidence that policymakers are working to
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address this. Legislators and attorneys general in many states are addressing monopsonistic
power and overreach by investigating non-competes, no poach agreements, and other
worker-mobility-reducing actions. Further, congress is working to break up highly
consolidated megacorporations like Amazon (Mattioli, D., & Tracy, R., 2021). Policy
action is limited because of monopsonistic power itself, as corporations spend significant
amounts of profit to influence politicians to protect corporate power. In 2018, U.S.
corporations spent at least $3.4B on reported lobbying (Evers-Hillstrom, K., 2019). Since
the 1970s, 90% of U.S. workers experienced below average wage growth, while highly
paid workers “and owners of capital reaped large rewards made possibly only by this
anemic wage growth for the bottom 90%” (Mishel, L., & Bivens, J., 2021). In conclusion,
the power wielded by megacorporations is responsible for widely documented wage
suppression in the United States.
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